This article will object to Sidgwick's axiom that from the point of view of the universe, the good of one is no more important than the good of another as it is analytical. I will present the purpose and content of the axiom with a further explanation of what I mean by "the point of view of the universe". I will then consider the Egoist's response to the axiom and Sidgwick's counterresponse to illustrate the tautology of the argument. The tautology of the argument brings it into line with other axioms that Sidgwick dismisses as meaningless. Therefore, I argue that the third axiom fails to meet the same standards as Sidgwick, rendering its usefulness and meaning questionable. In response to this, I believe that the axiom can be analytic but in a non-trivial and therefore still valid way. However, since the axiom is still easily refuted by the egoist, I ultimately conclude that it fails to be meaningful in any meaningful way. During his examination of commonsense morality, Sidgwick advances a series of propositions that he believes pass his tests to achieve the goal. greatest possible certainty. Furthermore, these axioms provide the basis of his argument for adopting utilitarianism. Probably the most important of these axioms is the third, according to which “the good of an individual is no more important, from the point of view... of the Universe, than the good of any other; unless, that is, there are special reasons for believing that more good is likely to be accomplished in one case than in the other.” What Sidgwick meant by “point of view of the universe” is not explained in the methods, although in a later article he suggests that it is “what all rational beings, as such, should aim to realize”. With this, I take… middle of the paper… a view of the universe, its usefulness and meaning limited to those who probably would not have initially objected. Therefore, I do not think that the axiom represents an “evident moral principle of real significance,” as Sidgwick intended, unless one is already inclined to accept the axiom, as, for example, a utilitarian probably would. Works Cited Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981), p. 379Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 382Classroom lesson, February 25, 2010Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 382Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 382Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 420Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 374Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 375Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 379Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 379Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 379