In the post-Osama bin Laden era, al-Qaedist ideology is flourishing throughout the Arab world. A significant development has been the rise of al-Qaeda offshoots in the Middle East. The Abdallah Azzam Brigades franchise has increasingly become a notable player in terrorism. On May 8, 2012, Thomas Nides, Deputy Secretary of State, designated the Abdallah Azzam Brigades as a foreign terrorist organization (Nides, TR, 2012). The Abdullah Azzam Brigades may have only recently been added as a foreign terrorist group; however, the organization has deep roots, lethal capabilities, and is capable of contributing to further instability in the Middle East. The Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) have several aliases listed by the State Department: Abdullah Azzam Brigades, Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions, and Yusuf al-'Uyayri Battalions of the Abdullah Azzam Brigades (Nides, TR, 2012). AAB first emerged in 2004, after claiming responsibility for an attack in Egypt. On October 7, the day after the Egyptian holiday commemorating the 1973 war with Israel, a truck bomb exploded next to the Hilton Hotel in the resort town of Taba, near the Israeli border. Just south of Taba, smaller bombs exploded at a campsite popular with Israelis. Two days later, Abdullah Azzam Bridagdes-Al Qaeda in Egypt and the Levant claimed responsibility (Winter, 2011, p. 884). AAB claimed two more attacks in Egypt after the first bombing. Within a few months of each other, the attackers targeted the most popular tourist and holiday areas. In April 2005, a suicide bomber blew himself up with his vest in Cairo's main bazaar; followed by the bomber's sister and wife who open fire on a tour bus and then kill themselves (Winter, 2011, p. 884). In July 2005, the Sinai Peninsula was hit again... middle of paper... Evaluation of al Qaeda affiliates, 2014). This is not to say that the organization cannot or will not attempt to target Israel or Western interests in the region. The AAB's lethal attacks are indicative of a legitimate organization with a lineage of sophisticated jihadist leadership. The organization does not appear to be pursuing the same high-casualty impact that has become al Qaeda's signature (Winter, 2011, p. 891). At the same time, the group appears incapable of cultivating a sizable number of “resistance call units.” (Winter, 2011, p. 891) However, neither is necessary to have a significant impact. The Middle East is in a period of transition; by inflaming sectarian tensions and reinforcing insecurity, it only takes a small group to act as saboteurs (Winter, 2011, p. 891). Until the attacks cease or the cells are destroyed, the AAB will be a relevant terrorist organization.