When explaining cultural relativism, it is useful to compare and contrast it with ethical relativism. Cultural relativism is a theory of morality centered on the concept that matters of custom and ethics are not universal in nature but rather are culture-specific. Each culture evolves its own unique moral code, separate and apart from any others. Ethical relativism is also a theory of morality with a view of ethics similarly committed to understanding how morality is defined culturally. However, the formulation is quite different in that, starting from a wide range of human habits, individual opinions push the culture towards distinguishing normal “good” habits from abnormal “bad” habits. The bottom line is that both theories share the guiding principle that morality is limited by culture or society. Implicit in the basic formulations of both theories, a culture's moral code is neither superior nor inferior to any other. The codes of individual cultures are simply different and there is no standard or basis upon which to make any kind of comparison. Therefore, according to both theories, the lack of standards between cultures means that attempts to judge the relative correctness or incorrectness between them cannot be justified. For cultural relativism, it is perfectly normal that something that one culture sees as moral, another may see as immoral. There is no connection between them, so they are never in conflict regarding their moral beliefs. However, in the context of ethical relativism there is a significant difference. Normally, two cultures possess varying proportions of the same normal and abnormal habits, but from a cross-cultural point of view, what is abnormal in one culture can be seen as properly normal in a... medium of paper.... ... the implication would be significant in that it would give rise to a judgment about morality outside and independently of culture. An example would be the active practice of anti-Semitism aimed at the destruction of the Jewish people. Could such a practice ever be interpreted as an opinion or even as a cultural custom? In any case it would be difficult to imagine anything less than a universal condemnation of killing for any reason other than genocide. This objection is strong and perhaps opens up an avenue of attack on cultural relativism on the basis of some kind of universal morality. It is impossible to conceive of an arbiter judging such a class of morality. Even if the example is highly suggestive, it does not amount to demonstrating with certainty that there are sufficient reasons to say that it should be right to consider any custom of another culture as inferior.