Leading this group is Paul Collier, a traditional economist. In an investigation aimed at explaining “why civil wars occur” in relation to determining economic variables, Collier and Hoeffler (1996) concluded that “per capita income, natural resource endowment, inequality and ethnic fragmentation linguistics” are the main risk factors for the occurrence of a civil war (cited in Cramer, 2003, p. 399). They concluded that, rather than causing civil wars, (greater) inequality “significantly reduces the risk and duration of war” (see Cramer, 2003, pp. 399). From their regression analysis which showed an inverse relationship between inequality and conflict, they argue that a high degree of inequality in a state is indicative of the existence of a ruling elite which, for the sake of its attachment to the status quo and desire to protecting this would allow the government to temporarily tax them otherwise to raise funds to execute the war. Knowing that this fact would deter potential rebels, they [potential rebels] would understand that the government would have a greater ability to suppress any aggression from any side. Therefore, inequality is not good for conflict (Cramer 2003). Applying the same framework in his subsequent study, Collier (2000a) concluded that greed, not resentment, is at the root of civil wars. According to him “it is the feasibility of predation that determines the risk of conflict. …rebellion is motivated by greed, so it occurs when rebels can profit from war” Collier 2000a, quoted in Goodhand 2001,