1. He criticizes the German Army Group G commander's efforts to balance operational factors in achieving assigned objectives and protecting the German operational COG against the dual threat of the FFI and the expected Allied amphibious assault. General Blaskowitz, commander of German Army Group G had an extremely challenging task of balancing operational factors to achieve the objectives assigned to his organization. The German leader, Adolf Hitler, and the high command of his German armed forces, the OKW, aimed at the desired end state of German domination of Europe. To achieve this desired end goal, the theater strategic objective for OB West, German theater command was the defense of France, both from the ongoing Allied invasion in Normandy and from an expected Allied amphibious assault in southern France. General Blaskowitz's operational objective, as outlined by Hitler and the German high command, was to defend southern France, with the mission to "hold the coast at all costs". (p. 16) The operational Center of Gravity (COG) for the Germans in southern France was Army Group G, almost by default. The German high command had few naval or air resources to devote to the defense of southern France due to the competing demands of France's eastern, Italian, and northern fronts. Therefore the responsibility for repelling an Allied invasion would fall squarely on the ground troops. Under the command of General Blaskowitz, the majority of its fighting force resided in the troops of the Nineteenth Army. The Nineteenth Army, commanded by General Wiese, was composed of experienced troops commanded by veteran leaders. In June 1944, Army Group G's operational strength factor was a “reasonably strong and well-balanced force…middle of paper. ...the bridgeheads (General Wiese attempted to speed up the deployment of troops across the Rhone as much as possible on the night of August 14). If the Germans had possessed the ability to maneuver their troops before the invasion and on D-Day, the landing troops would have suffered many more casualties and may have failed to establish a beachhead. Finally, with better communication Gen Wiese could have quickly organized a counterattack against the Allies. The lack of casualties on D-Day and D+1 and the Allied ability to achieve nearly the entire D-Day objective highlight the importance of Allied efforts to address critical German vulnerabilities that led to the invasion. Instead of countering the German COG (Nineteenth Army) at full strength, the Allies resisted lightly and achieved their operational objectives.