Ross considers the nature of moral knowledge in different places, namely The Right and the Good and Foundations of Ethics. He believes that the acquisition of moral knowledge is comparable to the acquisition of mathematical knowledge, since in both mathematics and ethics we have certain crystalline intuitions from which we construct everything we can know about the nature of numbers and the nature of duty. (1939, 144)In the following I will elaborate the key elements of Rossian moral epistemology, namely the idea of ​​self-evidence, fallibility, justification and their relationship will be investigated in detail. To clarify the notion of self-evident, I will discuss the relationship between justification of self-evident moral propositions and “further reflection” in the Rossian framework. I believe, as do many contemporary Rossian moral philosophers, that there is no necessary connection between evidence and obviousness. There are, as I show, some self-evident propositions that require further reflection to justify. Furthermore, it does not follow from Ross's theory that self-evident propositions are infallibly true; rather, some self-evident propositions (prima facie duties) are fallible and can be false. In this way I use two terms to further elaborate this idea; that is, evidently justified and evidently true. Next I will examine Ross's ideas about the self-evident and his theory of justification. To this end, the idea of ​​modest foundationalism will be discussed. Finally, I will address the question of particularism in actual duties and generalism in prima facie duties.2.2.1. Belief about prima facie duties and actual duties In this section I will first discuss two types of beliefs in Rossi… in the middle of the paper… cal process, we understand the generality of prima facie moral truth when we see some particular moral cases. But this is not inferential, it is intuitive. In other words, seeing how many times individual cases of keeping a promise are prima facie is not important, because this method is not enumerative. To conclude, as Stratton-Lake says, Ross does not say clearly what it means to say that moral principles are evident, indeed it is somehow clear what he does not want to say. He argues that an evident proposition is not necessarily an obviously true proposition (1930, 2002, 29). Furthermore, it does not say that an obvious principle is one about which there is no serious debate. According to him we have direct knowledge of evident moral principles, that is, knowledge that is often not derivable, but which in some cases could be derived from an even more basic belief..