According to Robert Jervis, in order for an actor to determine how he or she will act, he or she must predict how others will behave and how their actions will affect their values. The actor will develop an image and intentions of others (Jervis 1968). He believes that misperception can dominate an actor's mind, ignoring accurate information. Develop fourteen hypotheses, seven about misperception and seven about perception Yes, I agree with Jervis' hypotheses. An actor's misperception of others causes others to misperceive as well. Jervis argues that decision makers tend to fit incoming information to their existing theories and images. They basically perceive what they want, no matter what, because their theories and images are set up to only allow them to notice certain things. He uses the Russians as an example, as if a person believes that the Russians are aggressive, then it is logical for him to be suspicious of their moves (Jervis 1968). Jervis states in his article War and Perceptions that these estimates, which are logically independent, can be psychologically linked (Jervis 1988). Woods and Stout found that Saddam worked to project a well-defined, if multi-headed, public persona: the object of a cult of personality at home, a modern liberator of the “Arab nation” in the region, and a regional hegemonic vis-à-vis the community international. As a result, many Western observers often saw him as the “madman of the Middle East” (Wood and Stout 2010). The American-Japanese crisis of 1940 is also an example. For example, national leaders may lack choices due to structural or systemic constraints, or due to their own cognitive processes. But if they see themselves as having only one course of action, then their evaluation... in the center of the card... a better place if everyone stopped to think before making a decision based on their theories and image. The misperception may be a coincidence, rather than a determinant, of the occurrence of war, because war may be an equilibrium outcome that results from specific configurations of actors' preferences. Although misperception sometimes plays a causal role in the outbreak of war, its impact is limited to the situation. Works Cited Jervis, Robert. 1968. “Hypotheses on Misperception.” World Politics (April): 454-56. Jervis, Robert. 1988. “War and Misperception.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History (Spring): 675-700Stein, Arthur A. 1982. “When Misperception Matters.” World Politics (July): 505-26.Woods, Kevin M., Stout Mark E. 2010. “Saddam's Perceptions and Misconceptions: The Case of 'Desert Storm'.” The Journal of Strategic Studies (February): 5-41.