Since the oil price shock of 1973, the history and behavior of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has received considerable attention in both the academic literature and the media. Many conflicting theoretical and empirical interpretations have been proposed about the nature of OPEC and its influence on global oil markets. The debate is not centered on whether OPEC limits production, but on the reasons behind these restrictions. Others explain the production cuts that occurred in the 1970s in terms of the transfer of property rights from international oil companies to governments (Johany, 1980; Mead, 1979). Others explain production restrictions in terms of coordinated actions by OPEC members. Within the literature, OPEC behavior ranges from the classic textbook cartel to the two-block cartel (Hnyilicza and Pindyck, 1976), to the bumbling cartel (Adelman, 1980), to the dominant firm (Salant, 1976; Mabro, 1991), to the cooperative oligopoly, to the monopolistic residual firm (Adelman, 1982) and more recently to the bureaucratic cartel (Smith, 2005). Others have suggested that OPEC oscillates between various positions but always acts as a faltering federation of producers (see for example Adelman, 1982; Smith, 2005). Existing empirical evidence has not helped narrow these different views. Griffin's (1985) observation in the mid-1980s that empirical studies tend "to reach to the shelf of economic models to select one, to validate its choice by indicating selected events not inconsistent with the model's prediction" still dominates the empirical approach to the study of OPEC's behavior and its price-setting power. Let's examine OPEC's ability to influence oil prices. As with every other issue related to OPEC, there are differing opinions regarding its pricing power. M... half the paper... demand from oil importers (which is unlikely to show signs of abating in the near future), the situation will get worse. In the process, OPEC may simply continue to exercise its “call failure” more often in order to counteract its own revenue loss leading to further spikes. As a result, problems for developing and least developed oil-importing countries would add to the threat of resilience and severely limited macroeconomic management. We can conclude that OPEC's claim that it has indeed lost price setting or price setting power cannot be accepted. and Saudi Arabia's role is very important and cannot be overlooked. Therefore, the recommendation is that everyone should try to be self-sufficient and not so energy dependent on other countries and should try to reduce their import bill by being less dependent on oil imports..